1er avril 2014 - Logic, beliefs and effortful processing : the case for intuitive logic

Prochaine conférence :

Logic, beliefs and effortful processing : the case for intuitive logic

Simon Handley
Professeur de psychologie, Plymouth University, UK

Mardi 1er avril 2014 - 18h15 - Uni Mail - salle R040

Dual process accounts of reasoning make a distinction between Type 1 processes that are claimed to be automatic and intuitive in nature and Type 2 processes that are conscious and effortful to apply. Beliefs influence logical reasoning because reasoners ar e unable to inhibit belief based responses in favour of resource intensive, logic based analysis. In this presentation I will review a range of recent evidence that is difficult to reconcile with these accounts: 1) Belief based errors in reasoning increase with age and cognitive capacity; 2) Evaluating the logical validity of a conclusion on a simple reasoning task is often accomplished more quickly than evaluating its believability; 3) The logical validity of a conclusion interferes with judgments of its believability more than vice versa and 4) Reasoners prefer sentences that are logically implied by previous text more than sentences that are not logically implied, irrespective of their believability. Taken together these findings suggest that logical reasoning is often accomplished rapidly and ‘by default’. We discuss these findings in the context of recent claims of an intuitive basis for logical processing.

Lecture proposée

Morsanyi, M. & Handley, S.J. (2012). Logic feels so good – I like it! Evidence for intuitive detection of logicality in syllogistic reasoning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 38, 596-616.

Handley, S.J., Newstead, S.E. & Trippas, D. (2011). Logic, beliefs and instruction: A test of the default interventionist account of belief bias. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition 37, 28-43.